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Erica Fudge
Learning to laugh: children and being human in early modern
thought1
To laugh at every thing, betokeneth a foole: neither maist thou laugh
a lowd at any thing: nor stirre and shake thy body in laughing, in a
cause of great laughter, thou must smile and shewe a modest ioyfull-
ness. But, beware thou laugh not at any ribawdrie or filthie knaverie,
nor once smile thereat. Too earnest & violent laughter, is seemly for
no age: but most unseemly for children.
(W.F., The Schoole of good manners, 1595)
This essay examines the role of laughter in the formation of the human
being in early modern thought, and looks particularly at the formative
years of the human; at the reason why, for W.F., the violent laughter of a
child was the most unseemly laughter there could be. Looking particularly
at the question of the nature of the child under Calvinism, I hope to
show not merely that Reformed writers were interested in children,
childhood and education in ways that previous generations of writers had
not been (others have already done that extremely clearly)2 but that the
concept of the child and its capacity to laugh formed under the influence
of Aristotle and Calvin allows us to think about the status of children in
some new ways.
The first question that must be asked is an apparently simple one:
What, in early modern England, is a child? The obvious answer is that a
child is an immature human being, but this statement creates problems,
problems that require another question. What is a human? This essay will
answer that question in the first instance with the application of some
Aristotelian logic; that is, it will examine what it is that makes a child –
and I am thinking initially about the infant – a human. It will then trace
the ways in which an answer to that question might allow us to think about
the ways in which children were educated and trained in the Reformed
culture of late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England, and about
the role of laughter in that construction of the human.
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Middle terms
Jonathan Barnes offers a brief, and useful guide to one form of Aristotelian
logic, the logic of causes: ‘the fact that we are trying to explain,’ he writes,
‘can be expressed in a simple subject–predicate sentence: S is P. The question
we ask is: Why is S P?’ He turns to what he calls the ‘middle term’ (M) that
offers the link between S and P, and that allows for the statement S is P
because of M.3 Thus, if we take the infant as the subject (S) and the human
as the predicate (P), what we are looking for is the middle term that offers
the causal link. We look, in fact, to what are termed the ‘properties’ of
humanity. The question why is S P becomes then: What qualities does an
infant share with the adult that would allow us to think of the infant as
human? In early modern England a list of properties of humanity could be
drawn up: it would include speech, reason, memory, judgement, dreams,
prophetic powers, all of which are presented as proper only to humans.4
But the focus here is on the early modern child – or more particularly at
this point, the infant (the infant matures as the essay progresses) – so it will
begin with some of these properties of humanity to see to what extent they
form a middle term between infant and human.
In 1631 Daniel Widdowes wrote: ‘All Creatures are reasonable, or
unreasonable. They which want reason, are Beasts, who live on Land or in
Water. Those which live on the earth, moove on the earth, or in the ayre.’5
This is clear and to the point. There are two sides to this debate: reason
and unreason, human and beast. Widdowes’ designation of difference is
not, of course, new in the mid-seventeenth century: classical thought was
premised, in many ways, on the fact that reason was the property of
humans. Or, to put it another way, that humans were unique in their
ability to reason abstractly. 6 Animals, on the other hand, could only reason
simply, relying on the presence of immediate stimuli. What this distinction
allows for is the easy and apparently unquestionable demonstration of the
superiority of humans.
But, if the human is defined as a ‘rational animal’, an infant displays
none of the qualities that might be understood to come under the heading
of reason in early modern thought – intellect, memory, judgement; therefore
it cannot be said, following this, that an infant is a human. Likewise, it is
hard to assume that an infant can communicate through speech, or
experience prophetic dreams, the nature of which could be expressed only
through speech.7
Perhaps the simplest way of representing the deficiency of animals is
to turn to the issue of temporality. Widdowes wrote, following convention,
that ‘Memorie calling backe images preserved in former time, is called
Remembrance: but this is not without the use of reason, and therefore is
onely attributed to man.’8 In similarly conventional terms Thomas Wright
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argued that ‘beasts regard only or principally what concerneth the present
time, but men forecast for future events; they knowe the meanes and the
end, and therefore comparing these two together, they provide present
meanes for a future intente.’9 Animals have only a present; they cannot
conceive (remember) a past, and they cannot imagine (forecast) a future.
The world of the non-human is always materially present, always limited,
always driven by urges that the human can transcend.
However, the distinction of human from animal is not always as
simple as it might appear to be in these texts. According to William
Kempe, writing in 1588, and following classical convention, ‘youth is
forgetfull, not greatly moved with regard of things past, or things to
come, but wholy caried away with that which is before their face.’10
Eleven years later Thomas Wright wrote of children that ‘they lacke the
use of reason, and are guided by an internall imagination, following
nothing else but that pleaseth their senses, even after the same maner
as bruite beastes doe’.11 Like animals, children are concerned only with
what is in front of them, with what is present, and not with the past
or the future, or what is absent or remembered. A sheep, according to
discussions of memory, can recall that it is scared of a wolf only when
the wolf stands before it; it cannot actively recall a wolf in its absence
and scare itself by imagination.12 Active recall – reminiscence – is the
property of humanity. Kempe is saying the same thing of youths, and
if, following J.A. Sharpe, we see ‘youth’ in the early modern period as
the stage between 14 and 28 years of age, the issue of present-mindedness
may well be even clearer when thinking of infants and children.13 These
are creatures who live only in the now.
So how can the first question – What is a child? – be answered? If a
child fails to display the so-called properties of humanity, is a child human?
The answer might have to be ‘no’. But there is one property, deliberately
ignored in the discussion so far, that does offer an answer: laughter. In De
partibus animalium Aristotle wrote that man is ‘the only animal that
laughs’,14 and this argument became a commonplace for two millennia,
repeated by, among others, Porphyry, Galen, Boethius, Erasmus, Vives and
Castiglione.15 Here the subject–predicate relationship finds its middle term:
a child is a human because laughter is proper only to humans, and a child
laughs. An infant, whose language capacity or ability to exercise reason is
limited, is able to laugh, and is therefore revealed as human. A dog (even
an adult dog) can never laugh – dog laughter is something I come back
to – because a dog is never ever human.
Laughter, then, provides a middle term between human and child. It
also, in Reformed discussions in early modern England, offers a link
between mind and body; between the immaterial and the material.
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Belly laughs
According to M.A. Screech, Aristotle’s writings on laughter are ‘the pillar
on which whole edifices of thought were raised’.16 And in De partibus
animalium Aristotle sets out the basis for all early modern interpretations.
He turns to the midriff. This, he writes, is present in all ‘sanguineous
animals’ and divides ‘the region of the heart from the region of the stomach’.
As such, this ‘partition-wall and fence’ separates the ‘nobler from the less
noble parts’: the heart from the liver. As well as having this vital physiological
function the midriff also serves as a site of a further and more generally
important division. Aristotle argues ‘[t]hat heating of [the midriff ] affects
sensation rapidly and in a notable manner is shown by the phenomena of
laughing. For when men are tickled they are quickly set a-laughing, because
the motion quickly reaches this part, and heating it though but slightly
nevertheless manifestly so disturbs the mental action as to occasion move-
ments that are independent of the will.’ The shared physiology of man and
animal with which Aristotle begins this section breaks down with the
impact of heating the midriff. He writes, ‘[t]hat man alone is affected by
tickling is due firstly to the delicacy of his skin, and secondly to his being
the only animal that laughs.’ What also breaks down is the importance of
the human will in the establishment of the human as a separate and
particular being. Will – an immaterial, reasoned capacity – is overwhelmed
by the body.17
In early modern versions this bodily power of laughter is frequently
repeated. The focus here is initially on a French Catholic text – Laurent
Joubert’s Traite du Ris (Treatise on Laughter) of 1579 – but what I hope
becomes clear is that many of the preoccupations of this, the fullest
discussion of laughter in the period, are also found in Reformed English
writings. What differ are the conclusions the Catholic and the Reformed
writers draw from their classical sources.
Following classical convention, Laurent Joubert argued that laughter
‘is common to all, and proper to man’. He outlines the physical effect of
laughing:
Everybody sees clearly that in laughter the face is moving, the mouth
widens, the eyes sparkle and tear, the cheeks redden, the breast heaves,
the voice becomes interrupted; and when it goes on for a long time
the veins in the throat become enlarged, the arms shake, and the legs
dance about, the belly pulls in and feels considerable pain; we cough,
perspire, piss, and besmirch ourselves by dint of laughing, and
sometimes we even faint away because of it.18
Pissing oneself, it seems, is proper to humans.19
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He goes on, and looks beyond the apparent, visible manifestation of
laughing on the body to its internal operation. The pericardium, ‘the sheath
or cover of the heart,’ he writes, ‘pulls on the diaphragm to which it is
thoroughly connected in men, quite otherwise than in animals. . . . And
this is (in my opinion) the reason, or at least one of the principal ones, why
only man is capable of laughter.’20 The diaphragm is moved via the
convulsion of the heart in the pericardium, and it is this that causes what
Erasmus terms a kind of ‘fit’, otherwise known as laughter.21 Once again,
it is the human anatomy, this time the fact that in humans the pericardium
is connected to the diaphragm, that causes laughter.
But of course, laughter that is due to mere anatomy is limited. Being
tickled does provoke laughter, but this is termed ‘bastard laughter’ as it is a
purely bodily response, requiring no operation of the mind. The other
‘untrue’ version of laughter is ‘dog laughter’, or the ‘cynic spasm’ as Joubert
terms it.22 This is false, and emerges either through willed contortion of
the face (‘angry and threatening dogs have this look’), or injury (a knife to
the diaphragm): it is therefore potentially both reasonable (willed) and
unreasonable (bodily). In the English Schoole of good manners (1595) by
W.F. the distinction drawn by Joubert is reiterated. W.F. writes: ‘some laugh
so unreasonably, that therewith they set out their teeth like grinning dogs.’23
The lack of reason, and the overwhelmingly bodily response turn a man
into an animal. The belief in the possibility of such a metamorphosis, it
seems, transcends religious difference.
There is, however, for both Joubert and Reformed writers, an alterna-
tive form of laughter that is based upon physiological factors – the
possession of the link between pericardium and diaphragm – but that goes
beyond the merely material. The true laugh (as opposed to the bastard or
dog laugh) calls upon the workings of the immaterial, the mind, and it is
this laugh that is truly the property of humanity. Joubert writes, following
Aristotelian convention, that all passions – the appetites of the mind, such
as joy, hate, anger and so on – ‘proceed . . . from the sensitive appetite’. He
goes on:
This [sensitive] faculty necessarily precedes the movement of the
heart. And yet we say that one does not covet the unknown, for in
imagining an object, and judging it good or bad, the humors, agitated
by our noticing it, affect the heart, which as though hit and struck, is
moved, desiring or disdaining the object.24
Likewise, in England, Thomas Wright proposed:
Passions and sense are determined to one thing, and as soone as they
perceive their object, sense presently receives it, and the passions love
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or hate it: but reason, after she perceiveth her object, she stands in
deliberation, whether it bee convenient shee should accept it, or
refuse it.25
What follows this natural, and inevitable movement (from eye, to brain, to
heart), for both Joubert and Wright, is a struggle between rationality and
physicality. The danger is that the will will be overwhelmed by the motions
of the heart; that the rational soul will be taken over by the sensitive.
Joubert’s image to illustrate this point comes from Plato: the will’s relation
to the heart, Joubert writes, ‘is like a child on the back of a fierce horse that
carries it impetuously about, here and there, but not without the child’s
turning it back some, and, reining in, getting it back on the path’.26 He goes
on to emphasize that, despite this battle, reason can rule the heart through
something akin to ‘civil or political [power] where with authority one points
out obligations’. (This is opposed to another form of power that is used by
reason as a last resort wherein it ‘simply commands’.) The will, therefore, is
‘free . . . to choose or refuse the right thing’.27 Robert Burton, too, repeated
this image: ‘Wee are torne in peeces by our passions, as so many wild horses,
one in disposition, another in habite, one is melancholy, another mad.’28
However, the power of movement, which is voluntary, is always at the
command of the will, but the power of the sensitive appetite, in Joubert’s
conventional terms, ‘does not obey immediately, and often contradicts
the will, employing long arguments and various thoughts, after which it
sometimes happens that the diverted will yields to the emotions’. The fact
that laughter can resist the will, that we can laugh – and sometimes feel we
have to laugh – in spite of ourselves, shows that laughter cannot be ‘under
the rational . . . faculty’: that it must be of the ‘sensitive faculty’ which
humans share with animals.29 This sharing of a form of perception has wider
implications, however. As Thomas Wright notes, in the
alteration which Passions woorke in the witte, and the will, wee may
understand the admirable metamorphosis and change of a man from
himselfe when his affects are pacified, and when they are troubled.
Plutarch said they changed them like Circes potions, from men into
beasts.30
It is because of the conflict between mind and body that is innate to
laughter that it becomes an important aspect of being human. In fact, a
true laugh becomes a necessary exhibition of human-ness.31 Quentin
Skinner has recently shown in great detail a key understanding of the
nature of laughter in Renaissance thought.32 Again, the precedent is
classical, but this time Socratic rather than Aristotelian: according to
Quintilian, laughter ‘has its source in things that are either deformed or
282
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 St
rat
hc
lyd
e] 
at 
08
:26
 08
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
2 
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disgraceful in some way’.33 In this Quintilian is following Socrates who
proposed that laughter is a ‘combined’ emotion. Socrates argued: ‘when we
laugh at the ridiculous qualities of our friends, we mix pleasure with pain.’34
But Joubert, bringing these different classical schools together, goes even
further: in the experience of joy, he argues, the heart expands, while in the
experience of sorrow it shrinks. One can die of joy (the heart can burst),
but one cannot die of laughter, because laughter is a dilation and contraction
of the heart, it is a movement between joy and sorrow. For this reason
laughter is perceived to proceed from ‘a double emotion’: ‘laughable matter,’
Joubert writes, ‘gives us pleasure and sadness.’35
This innately contemptuous quality of laughter uproots any links to
joy that might be assumed to be inherent in this human expression, and
the scornfulness is repeated by numerous early modern thinkers including
Baldessare Castiglione, Thomas Wilson, Robert Burton (who of course
takes on the persona of Democritus, the laughing philosopher in his
Anatomy of Melancholy), Sir Thomas Browne and Thomas Hobbes.36
Joubert writes, ‘inasmuch as laughter is caused by something ugly, it does
not proceed from pure joy, but has some small part of sadness.’37 The link
between joy and sadness gives the laugher a particular sense of themselves:
as Hobbes put it, ‘the passion of Laughter is nothyng else but a suddaine
Glory arising from suddaine Conception of some Eminency in our selves,
by Comparison with the Infirmityes of others, or with our owne formerly.’38
In laughing, humans simultaneously acknowledge an exterior failure and
their own success. Laughing as such is a moment of self-reflection as well
as self-aggrandizement. It is where, as Screech has shown, the dictum nosce
teipsum – know thyself – is put to work.39 Without self-knowledge how
could one recognize the deformity of others?
This is where we shift from viewing laughter as a purely bodily (and
therefore unwilled) phenomenon to laughter as something that invokes
and requires the will, and it is where early modern texts shift from purely
Aristotelian to Socratic thought. To laugh is to perform an act of judgement,
it is to discriminate, and this is yet another reason why animals cannot
laugh. Not only is the pericardium not linked to the diaphragm in any
animal other than the human, but only the human has the judgement
required to truly laugh.
So the ‘true’ laugh is simultaneously of the body and of the mind.
One of the crucial things about it is that it cannot be faked; a true laugh is
always true – of the body, not quite willed (and therefore unfalsifiable), but
it is also, paradoxically, willed and therefore of the mind. A good laugh is
a laugh in which mind and body agree: in which what the intellectual
faculty regards as ‘deformed’ is in parallel with the bodily movement.40 A
loud laugh, however, does not show the absolute agreement of body and
mind: quite the contrary. Richard Greenham writes: ‘a foole when hee
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laugheth liftes up his voice, but the wise man is scarse heard.’41 A wise man
exercises control over his body; his almost silent laugh reflects the power of
his mind. Plato, like Christ, never laughed.42
For this reason laughter becomes a vital property of humanity. It is a
place where mind and body are brought into potential conflict. True
laughter, it might be said, is when the mind takes control of something
that is potentially and powerfully out of its control; it is when judgement
is not overwhelmed by the animal-body, but actually overwhelms it. This
is evidence of powerful reason. The laugh may be of the body, but the true
laugh is certainly of the mind.
The laughter of a child
This dangerous conflict between will and body that is central to laughter,
however, makes the laughter of a child somewhat problematic. According
to Aristotle and, following him, Pliny, an infant laughs only after its fortieth
day (Charles Darwin observed his children and found that they laughed
on their forty-fifth and forty-sixth days).43 Until that point, according to
my logic, the infant is not human, it is a mere animal being: it does not
have the discrimination to laugh, and so we get something else. Having
cited Pliny and Aristotle, Joubert writes that, not only are the muscles of
infants incapable of the kinds of convulsions necessary to laughter, but
they ‘do not conceive the laughable in their minds since they only know
during the first months what is necessary for life, just as do animals’. With
time, however, the infant does begin to laugh, but, as Joubert notes, there
are still problems: ‘the laughter of small children is counterfeit and
illegitimate, like dog laughter.’44 There seems to be some confusion here
between Joubert’s categories of bastard and dog laughter: dog laughter
implies fakery (a willed state), whereas bastard laughter involves nothing
more than the body. To say that a child can fake a laugh is to imply, I
think, that a child can produce a true laugh, something that Joubert would
want to deny.
However, if we accept that the child’s laugh (whatever else it is) is not
a true laugh we can begin to trace a logic. If true laughter is about making
judgements – Laurel L. Hendrix has called laughing ‘an act of reading’45 –
then a young child cannot truly laugh. An infant does not judge the world
around him or her: in Aristotelian terms, the fact that the world is
completely new means that a judgement beyond the ‘that’s new’ is impos-
sible and therefore concepts of good, bad, true, false, are problematic. An
infant lives, in fact, in a world of the immediate, and of wonder – it is
incapable of judgement, and therefore is merely astonished by its new
place. 46 This wonder may cause the heart to convulse, and therefore cause
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a form of laughter, but the lack of will involved means that this is not
laughter in its true sense: Joubert writes, ‘astonishment does not cause
laughter, but only holds the mind in suspense.’47 Albertus Magnus, follow-
ing Aristotle, argued that this suspension is not the end, rather it is the
beginning of philosophy: ‘wonder is the movement of the man who does
not know on his way to finding out.’48 Astonishment precedes laughter,
which is evidence of discrimination.
Joubert’s representation, then, is the more positive model of the child’s
laugh. It is a laughter of innocence that proclaims the purity of the child
itself. Adam and Eve, of course, did not learn the distinction between
good and evil until they ate the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge. A child,
laughing in wonder, is like the first parents, conversing naked without
shame. Dressing oneself, for Jacques Derrida, is one potential property of
humanity;49 it is a property that emerges only after the Fall, only after the
need to discriminate, and therefore only after the possibility of laughter.
An infant, like its pre-lapsarian parents, does not dress itself, nor can it
judge beyond its natural instincts. Discrimination has not yet entered to
change joyous wonder into scornful cackling.
But there is, of course, another way of interpreting the laughter of a
child, and this is the one that is held by most of the writers in early modern
England whose work I am looking at here. While they follow key aspects
of Joubert’s theory they differ on one particular issue: the status of the
child. The Fall, again, plays its part. For Robert Burton it was the cause of
human misery and lack of innate self-knowledge. On page 1 of The
Anatomy of Melancholy he wrote:
But this most noble Creature . . . O pittifull change! is falne from
what he was, and forfeited his estate, become miserablilis homuncio, a
cast-away, a catiffe, one of the most miserable creatures of the World,
if he be considered in his owne nature, an unregenerate man and so
much obscured by his fall (that some few reliques excepted) he is
inferiour to a beast. Man in honour that understandeth not, is like unto
beasts that perish, [Psalm 49:20] so David esteemes him: a monster by
a stupend Metamorphosis, a beast, a dogge, a hogge, what not?50
In this Burton is following a well-established Reformed tradition in which
emphasis is placed on human corruption and closeness to the beast. Thomas
Morton, writing in 1596, argued that post-lapsarian humans are ‘carnal
and worldly minded men’ who, ‘beholding the glorious creatures of God,
are no more affected then are the brute beastes, which never once lift up
their eies to heaven.’51 Leicester divine John Moore proposed ‘mutability’
as a quality innate to man, going on to argue that, where God was truly
immutable, man had both the ‘power of standing, and the possibility of
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falling: power of standing he had from God his creatour: possibility of
falling from himselfe, being a creature’.52 We can will our own destruction;
this is a product of the Fall.
It is not only that ‘man’, the adult, is judged differently in Reformed
theology, however. Calvin’s infamous denigration of the child (a being
previously held by the Roman church to be incapable ‘of mortal sin until
the age of seven’)53 gives the infant’s laughter a new meaning. The
‘depravity’54 (Calvin’s term) of the infant means that its laughter is merely
revelatory: it shows the infant’s innate and unexceptional sinfulness. In
fact, it shows the infant to be controlled by the body. There is no judgement
(no act of reason) – this is in agreement with Joubert’s more positive
(Catholic) model of children’s laughter – there is only body. And the only
source of astonishment for a Reformed thinker would be that adults might
think that the infant is innocent. It is that lack of judgement which reveals
a mind held in suspense; reading Calvin, we could argue, offers the route
from suspension to belief. How to acknowledge the corruption of the child,
the need for judgement, and moderation of the bodily response, is central
to conceptualizations of children and forms a cornerstone, I believe, of
many Reformed attitudes to education in the period.
Christian laughter
According to William Perkins, the first stage in parental care of the infant
is baptism,55 and here godparents make declarations on behalf of the child,
declarations that the child, as it matures, is expected to make for him or
herself. The reason for the intercession of the godparents is simple: Richard
Jones asked ‘Whether maie fooles, mad men, or children bee admitted to
the Supper of the Lord?’ His answer is clear: ‘No, for they cannot examine
themselves.’56 The godparents stand in to examine the child on his or her
behalf.57
Following baptism, parents are expected to continue with their
children’s godly education, and the catechism – the rote learning of
key religious questions and answers – emerges as a primary form of
indoctrination. C. John Sommerville has noted that catechitical ‘memoriza-
tion . . . was to make orthodoxy the child’s second nature’.58 What had been
external is made internal: what was culture begins to appear as nature. As
well as this, the catechism is a display of key properties of the human –
memory and speech. And the latter, according to John Dod and Robert
Cleaver, could precede the former: ‘let him have the words taught him
when he is able to heare and speake words, and after, when he is of more
discretion, he will conceive & remember the sense too.’59 Parroting precedes
speaking: animal, as ever, comes before human. In learning the catechism
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(parents were fined if the child had not learned it by the age of 8)60 the
child was displaying its entry into the human community as well as into
the Christian community: in fact, the two – human and Christian – seem
inseparable in this context. But speech, like Reformed doctrine, needs to
be overseen with care. W.F. advises his boy reader that, on hearing ribald
speeches by superiors, he should ‘make semblance, as though [he] heard
them not’.61 Feigned ignorance (an act of will) is more appropriate than
bastard laughter, as bastard laughter gives priority to the body, and returns
the human to its (dangerously natural) animal status.
But laughing itself – whether true, bastard or dog – is also problematic.
For divines the Scriptural evidence would seem to point away from laughing
at all. Christ never laughed: ‘he wept three times,’ wrote William Perkins,
‘at the destruction of Jerusalem, at the raising of Lazarus, and in his agonie:
but we never reade that he laughed.’62 As if this were not warning enough
the Old Testament also presents laughter as dangerous. II Kings 2:23–5
records the story of the children who laughed at Elisha’s baldness. Verse 24
reads, ‘And [Elisha] turned back, and looked on them, and cursed them in
the name of the LORD. And there came forth two she bears out of the
wood, and tare forty and two children of them.’ Screech writes of this,
‘God intended to fix irrevocably in men’s minds the respect due to elders
and to his ministers, who are in loco parentis. They must not be laughed
at.’63 He is, of course, right; but an even more general warning is also
recorded in this passage: laughter itself is dangerous. In 1595 W.F. noted
that ‘Too earnest & violent laughter, is seemly for no age: but most
unseemly for children.’64 Richard Greenham – referring, perhaps, to Psalm
111, ‘The fear of the LORD is the beginning of wisdom’ – states ‘When a
man is most merrie, he is nearest danger. . . . The way to godlie mirth, is to
feele godlie sorrow.’65
Yet these Reformed writers did not refuse laughter altogether. William
Perkins wrote, somewhat pragmatically: ‘As for laughter, it may be used:
otherwise God would never have given that power and facultie unto man.’
By implication, it is the property of humanity and should therefore be used
to express that humanity. Perkins goes on, however, to speak what is a
Reformed commonplace: ‘but the use of it must bee both moderate and
seldome, as sorrow for our sinnes is to be plentifull and often.’66 So, even
as Elisha’s curse seems to call for silence, there is a place wherein laughter
may be used. Following Thomas Aquinas’ belief that ‘sparing’ laughter
works as a useful relief to the mind (and revealing, once again, how indebted
the Reformed interpretation of laughter was to its Catholic predecessors),67
Perkins proposes that two kinds of jesting are ‘tolerable’ to Christians: the
first ‘is moderate and sparing mirth, in the use of things indifferent, in
season convenient, without the least scandal of any man, & with profit to
the hearers. The seco[n]d is that which the Prophets used, when they jested
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against wicked persons, yet so, as withall they sharply reprooved their
sinnes.’68 Religious laughter requires self-examination. A sin is risible only
if the laugher recognizes it as a sin. In doing this, the laugher not only
distances him or herself from the sinner, but from the sin as well. Scorn,
once again, is self-awareness, and it is this that the child must gain. A
Christian education must therefore include teaching the child to laugh.
Learning to laugh
In The Education of a Christian Prince Erasmus argued famously that
morality should be ‘pressed in, and rammed home’ through parables,
analogies, epigrams, and should be placed constantly before the child by
being ‘carved on rings, painted in pictures, inscribed on prizes’. He goes
on: ‘When the little pupil has enjoyed hearing Aesop’s fable of the lion
being saved in his turn by the good offices of the mouse . . . and when he
has had a good laugh, then the teacher should spell it [i.e. the moral] out.’69
Laughter here precedes learning; it is, in fact, the means by which the
lesson is learned. The bitter pill of education is sweetened with pleasure.
This sense of the importance of laughter – and pleasure – in the
classroom may be traced in the vast majority of Reformed English writings
on education in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.70 In his
dialogue on the correct forms of godly learning, Bartholomew Batty states
simply that ‘pleasure & delight’ are key.71 And Perkins, too, proposes that
‘the first instruction of children in learning and religion, must be so ordered,
that they take it with delight’.72 W.F. takes the link between learning and
pleasure into slightly different territory, writing: ‘learning is but sport and
play to such as have willing minds.’73 Play itself is often regarded as outside
of rather than a part of education: William Gouge warned, ‘Too much
sport maketh [children] wilde, rude, unfit to bee trained up to any good
calling, and spendeth their spirits, and wasteth their strength too much.’74
What was called for, here as in so many other things, was moderation.
Perkins’ laughter – indifferent, lacking in scandal and promoting morality –
was the ideal.
But it is not only as the sugaring of the pill of learning that laughter
operates in Reformed writings. It has a more significant role to play than
that. If laughing is, as I have argued, a moment when body and mind are
in potential conflict, and if one of the properties of being human is the
exhibition of reason (the control of the mind over the body), then laughing
must be brought under control as part of the process of becoming human.
There are two elements to the Reformed education, then – learning
doctrine, and learning human-ness – and these are both addressed in the
notion of ‘pleasurable’ learning. The fact that the infant laughs at so early
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a stage in its development signals not only, as Aristotle had said, that
laughter is natural – of the body – but that it needs to be modified,
controlled: rationalized. The rationing of laughter – making it modest and
directing it at things indifferent – was not merely mannerly nor, I would
argue, a part of what Norbert Elias termed ‘the regulation of instinctual
life’.75 Its function was part of a wider, and potentially even more significant
process: not that of becoming civilized, but that of becoming human. Now,
of course, civilization and human are often interchangeable terms in the
early modern period: what lacks civilization – a New World native, for
example – lacks human status. Robert Gray, for one, argued: ‘The report
goeth, that in Virginia the people are savage and incredibly rude, they
worship the divell, offer their young children in sacrifice unto him, wander
up and downe like beasts, having no Arte, nor scie[n]ce, nor trade, to
imploy themselves, or give themselves unto.’76 In this context, the perceived
‘beastliness’ of the natives allows for the civilized (Christian) English to lay
a claim to the land: it is not theft if that which is taken is never owned.
However, the missionary endeavour, the fact that one of the claims of the
Virginia Company was the need to spread the Christian doctrine in the
barbarous New World, meant that a concept of ‘monogenesis’ must be in
place.77 If the natives were not always-already human, how could they be
converted to the true faith? Underlying Gray’s apparent species distinction
persists a recognition of sameness.
In distinction from Gray and others writing about the encounters
with the natives, I am using ‘human’ here in what might be termed more
of a species than a civil sense: I am arguing that the human as a species
being was being made, implicitly and sometimes explicitly, in the process
of the regulation of laughter.78 In this sense, John Dod and Robert Cleaver’s
short, sharp dictat – ‘it were better for children to be unborne than
untaught’ – signals a very real understanding of the status of the child.79
It might sound like puritanical overstatement, but I think that it frames
a fear, a fear that the infant, the child, even the youth may not after all
become human without help. Learning to laugh is learning to give the
mind dominion over the body, and this is why a child’s laughter is
important.
What can be traced in early modern theories of laughter, then, is not
only scorn (a mixture of joy and sorrow) but also self-knowledge. If children
cannot receive the sacraments on their own behalf because, in Richard
Jones’ phrase, ‘they cannot examine themselves’, then a true laugh – a
regulated, learned laugh – represents evidence of self-examination. So
learning with ‘delight’ may be interpreted as being a double-layered entry
into human status. Not only are moral and religious truths of society made
natural, alongside this pleasure itself is a control of the body by the mind,
is a learned enculturation of the body, and this is central to the process of
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becoming human. In this sense, the reinsertion of Aristotle in the Renais-
sance canon, and the predominant inclusion of his ideas within theories of
laughter, and Calvin’s new assessment of the child, means that when we
look at the conceptualization of the human in many early modern English
texts, not only do we find those texts peopled with animals, we also find
that those animals may actually be children, children who are being taught
to laugh.
Middlesex University
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